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RESPONSE

A Way Forward for Tax Law and Economics?
A Response to Osofsky’s “Frictions,
Screening, and Tax Law Design”
DAVID GAMAGE†
Meaningful law and economics analysis of detailed tax
rules is notoriously difficult.1 At a high level of generality,
there are expansive public finance and tax theory
literatures that evaluate the overall structures of taxation.
But scholars have had only limited success in connecting
these theoretical literatures to the study of the actual
detailed rules that occupy most of the time and energy of
practicing tax lawyers and government officials.2
Osofsky’s excellent new paper—Who’s Naughty and
Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design—
suggests a path toward a more useful law and economics
analysis of detailed tax rules.3 To begin with, Osofsky’s
paper makes an important contribution to the literature on
tax frictions. Osofsky persuasively argues that tax frictions
should be designed to incorporate screening concerns.4 As
Osofsky documents, the existing literature on the design of
tax frictions has focused almost exclusively on the goal of
† Assistant Professor, UC Berkeley School of Law. Many thanks to the Buffalo
Law Review Editorial Staff.
1. Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 529-66 (2013).
2. Id. at 557-66.
3. Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and
Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1059 (2013).
4. Id. at 1083-1119.
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deterring wasteful tax planning.5 The literature has thus
analyzed how frictions can be designed to balance the goal
of deterring wasteful tax planning against the goal of not
imposing costs on regular business transactions.6 Yet the
frictions literature has not sufficiently incorporated the
implications of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ proclivity toward
tax planning.7
In contrast, as Osofsky also documents, the existing
literature on screening primarily focuses on ways in which
tax-system design can overcome the disincentives to work
caused by taxing income.8 Traditional optimal tax theory
has largely been concerned with the problem of taxpayers
working less in response to taxation.9 Yet the recent
empirical literature suggests that taxation has only small
effects—if any—on reducing taxpayers’ work effort.10
Instead, the recent empirical literature suggests that
taxpayers primarily respond to taxation through a variety of
responses that we might collectively refer to as “tax
planning” or “tax gaming.”11 Thus, as Osofsky convincingly
argues, the greatest potential for utilizing screening
mechanisms in taxation is likely in regard to tax planning
and tax gaming transactions.12
Incorporating the analysis of screening mechanisms
into the design of tax frictions, then, has the potential to
improve the tax law’s ability to deter wasteful tax planning
while imposing lower costs on regular business
transactions. The key here is to take advantage of the
information tax frictions can reveal about heterogeneity in
taxpayers’ proclivity toward tax planning. Osofsky argues
5. Id. at 1063-71.
6. Id. at 1074-75.
7. See id. at 1091.
8. Id. at 1077 & n. 61, 1084.
9. Id.
10. David Gamage, On Double-Distortion Arguments, Distribution Policy,
and the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments 30-39 (Sept. 25, 2013) (unpublished
draft manuscript) (on file with author).
11. Id.
12. Osofsky, supra note 3, at 1118-19.
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for a general principle that frictions should be designed so
as to impose higher differential costs on “tax planners”13—
on those taxpayers who have both greater “ability and
desire to engage in tax planning.”14 To the extent that
frictions can be designed to impose differentially greater
costs on tax planners, and lower costs on non-tax planners,
the frictions should better deter the wasteful tax planning
of the tax planners while imposing lower costs on the
regular business activities of non-tax planners.15
Equally interesting, in my view, is that combining the
methodologies of the tax screening and tax frictions
literatures potentially offers a path toward a law and
economics methodology capable of analyzing how detailed
tax rules should be designed to account for distributional
considerations. Alex Raskolnikov has recently elaborated
some of the fundamental problems with applying law and
economic methodologies to the study of detailed tax rules. 16
Perhaps the most fundamental of these problems is that tax
law is inherently about distribution.17
A number of scholars have suggested that the rules for
calculating tax bases should be designed to promote
efficiency, with distributional concerns handled exclusively
through the setting of tax rates.18 However, as I argue at
length in a recent work-in-progress, in light of evidence that
real-world income and consumption taxes are subject to
significant tax-gaming, it is important to consider
distribution when designing the rules for calculating tax
bases.19
13. Id. at 1061.
14. Id. at 1086-87.
15. Id. at 1089-91.
16. Raskolnikov, supra note 1.
17. Id. at 544-45.
18. E.g., David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1655-59 (1999). Indeed, I have also made
arguments along these lines in prior scholarship. See David Gamage & Darien
Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience,
65 TAX L. REV. 19, 74-78 (2011).
19. Gamage, supra note 10, at 76-78.
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Osofsky’s analysis suggests that tax rules might be
designed so as to take account both of heterogeneity in
taxpayers’ tax planning proclivities and of taxpayer
characteristics relevant for distribution. It is generally
understood that the U.S. income tax is relatively successful
at taxing the economic income of regular salaried
employees, but much less successful at taxing the economic
income of financiers and entrepreneurs and other taxpayers
with great wealth.20 By designing tax rules so as to create
frictions that differentially impose higher costs on these
taxpayers—who are more successfully circumventing
existing taxes—we can perhaps reform our tax system so as
to better achieve equitable distribution at lower efficiency
costs.
As Osofsky concludes: “It is time to ask, in a rigorous
way, how different groups of taxpayers are bearing [friction]
costs differently, based on underlying characteristics, and
how these differences should affect tax law design.”21 It is
my hope that the coming decades will witness the
development of a more refined tax law and economics
methodology that is better suited to analyzing detailed tax
rules. If so, Osofsky’s paper will undoubtedly play an
important part in the development of this (hopefully)
forthcoming revolution in tax law and economics.

20. See, e.g., David Gamage & Shruti Rana, Taxation and Incentives in the
Business Enterprise, in ENTERPRISE LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE
US AND JAPAN (Zenichi Shishido ed., forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 10-12)
(on file with author); Douglas A. Shackelford, The Tax Environment Facing the
Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE
RICH 114 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
21. Osofsky, supra note 3, at 1119.

